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A B S T R A C T
Despite an emerging literature, there is still sparse and mixed evidence on the wider societal beneﬁts of
Minimum Wage policies, including their eﬀects on mental health. Furthermore, causal evidence on the re-
lationship between earnings and mental health is limited. We focus on low-wage earners, who are at higher risk
of psychological distress, and exploit the quasi-experiment provided by the introduction of the UK National
Minimum Wage (NMW) to identify the causal impact of wage increases on mental health. We employ diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences models and ﬁnd that the introduction of the UK NMW had no eﬀect on mental health. Our esti-
mates do not appear to support earlier ﬁndings which indicate that minimum wages aﬀect mental health of low-
wage earners. A series of robustness checks accounting for measurement error, as well as treatment and control
group composition, conﬁrm our main results. Overall, our ﬁndings suggest that policies aimed at improving the
mental health of low-wage earners should either consider the non-wage characteristics of employment or po-
tentially larger wage increases.
1. Introduction
Mental health problems aﬀect around 18% of the working-age po-
pulation in England (van Stolk, Hofman, Hafner & Janta, 2014) and cost
the UK economy around £105 billion every year, arising mainly from
treatment costs, lost productivity and forgone income (Centre for
Mental Health, 2010). Furthermore, treatment costs for mental illness
alone represent around 13% of the overall NHS budget (Layard et al.,
2012). Given the magnitude of the costs caused by mental illness, it is
important to understand its determinants better, especially those re-
lating to the labour market.
A recent OECD (2012) report argues that mental illness is a key
issue for labour markets. The reason being that while physical health
issues mainly aﬀect the elderly, mental ill-health tends to be con-
centrated among people of working age. Hence, economic and policy
considerations might substantially diﬀer for people with mental versus
physical illness (Layard, 2015).
In line with this, the relationship between employment and mental
health has received growing attention in the literature (Baert, De
Visschere, Schoors & Omey, 2014; Greve &Nielsen, 2013; Paul &Moser,
2009; Teﬀt, 2012). Previous studies indicate that they appear to
inﬂuence each other. More speciﬁcally, people with low mental health
are less likely to be in paid employment (Marwaha & Johnson, 2004;
Rinaldi, Montibeller & Perkins, 2011) and conversely, individuals who
have been unemployed are disproportionally aﬀected by mental health
problems (Diette, Goldsmith, Hamilton & Darity, 2012; Paul &Moser,
2009).
Evidence on the relationship between earnings and mental health is
still sparse, especially among individuals at the bottom end of the in-
come distribution. Within the economic literature, a number of studies
have tried to disentangle the relationship between wealth and mental
health (Apouey & Clark, 2015; Ásgeirsdóttir, Corman, Noonan,
Ólafsdóttir & Reichman, 2014; Askitas & Zimmermann, 2011; Cesarini,
Lindqvist, Östling &Wallace, 2016; Lindahl, 2005; McInerney,
Mellor & Nicholas, 2013). These studies often employ either lottery
winnings or the Great Recession of 2008 as exogenous shocks to an
individual’s wealth (e.g. savings or ownership of property, shares and
life insurance). Overall, they ﬁnd small but positive eﬀects of increased
wealth on mental health. While these studies focus on the eﬀect of
wealth on mental health, they appear to pay little attention to in-
dividuals at the bottom 20% of the income distribution who are twice as
likely to experience mental illness compared to individuals with
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average incomes (Meltzer et al., 2002). Furthermore, although wages
constitute the core element of income for low-earning individuals, there
is limited evidence on the causal eﬀect of wages on mental health.1
In this paper, we explore whether wage increases causally improve
mental health among low-wage earners. This is important information
for policy makers when considering changes to the minimum wage. We
exploit the policy experiment provided by the introduction of the 1999
National Minimum Wage (NMW) and employ quasi-experimental
methods on data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to
identify the impact of wage increases on mental health.
The UK NMW was a signiﬁcant policy change introduced in April
1999 aimed at raising the wages of around two million workers with
estimated average wage increases of nearly 30% (Low Pay Commission,
1998). Prior to the NMW, the Trade Board Act of 1909 required wage
councils to set minimum wages for diﬀerent industries and these were
in place until 1993 while between 1993-1999 there was no legal wage
ﬂoor in the UK (Metcalf, 1999). Since access to mental health care is
associated with income, even in countries with universal health care
such as England (White, Gutacker, Jacobs &Mason, 2014), and the
minimum wage needed to live a healthy life in the UK has been found to
lie above the NMW (Morris, Donkin, Wonderling, Wilkinson & Dowler,
2000), the eﬀect of the NMW on mental health should be non-negli-
gible.
We estimate a series of diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DiD) models, in-
cluding panel data ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations and deﬁne mental health
using the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ), a psychometrically
validated tool. Our ﬁndings do not appear to show statistically sig-
niﬁcant causal eﬀects of the NMW on mental health. Robustness checks,
including alternative deﬁnitions of treatment and control groups based
on the previous economic literature concerning the employment eﬀects
of the UK NMW, appear to conﬁrm our main results. We discuss po-
tential explanations for our ﬁndings.
The paper oﬀers three main contributions to the literature. First,
this paper explores the causal impact of wage increases on mental
health, focusing speciﬁcally on low-wage earners. Secondly, we provide
new evidence on the potential unintended consequences of an im-
portant policy (the NMW) on mental health, a particularly relevant
outcome for the labour market. In doing so, we contribute directly to
the emerging literature on the health eﬀects of minimum wage policies.
These studies are mainly US based and still present mixed results. In
addition, by employing the UK NMW as a policy experiment, we revisit
the only UK causal evidence currently available on the relationship
between wages and mental health (Reeves, McKee, Mackenbach,
Whitehead & Stuckler, 2016). Our study diﬀers from Reeves et al.
(2016) in that we employ alternative deﬁnitions of treatment and
control groups. Finally, we contribute to the broader literature on the
eﬀects of socioeconomic status on mental health by focusing on changes
in wages.
2. Data
The data is drawn from waves 7 to 9 (29th of August 1997 to 30th of
April 2000) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) with the
NMW being introduced in April 1999, that is between waves 8 and 9.
The BHPS is a longitudinal dataset, which is representative of the whole
of Great Britain. The survey includes rich information on individual and
household socioeconomic as well as health related characteristics such
as physical and mental health, work, education, wages, income and
wealth (Lynn, 2006).
Since our main objective is to estimate the impact of the
introduction of the NMW on mental health, our sample does not include
individuals who did not qualify for the NMW. This comprises in-
dividuals in speciﬁc occupations such as the armed forces, the self-
employed, as well as retirees.2 Moreover, since the minimum wage only
applied to adults, we drop observations for individuals younger than 18
years old.
2.1. Mental health
We deﬁne mental health using the self-reported General Health
Questionnaire (GHQ), a validated screening tool for psychiatric illness
that is widely used in both mental health research and the economics
literature (Apouey & Clark, 2015; Goldberg &Williams, 1988;
Hauck & Rice, 2004). The BHPS includes the reduced 12-item version of
the GHQ which is based on the following items: concentration; sleep
loss due to worry; perception of role; capability in decision making;
whether constantly under strain; perception of problems in overcoming
diﬃculties; enjoyment of day-to-day activities; ability to face problems;
loss of conﬁdence; self-worth; general happiness; and whether suﬀering
from depression or unhappiness. Respondents score each individual
item from 0 to 3 with 0 being the best score. These 12 scores are then
aggregated into a scale ranging from 0 to 36 which is increasing in ill-
health i.e. lower scores correspond to lower mental health
(Goldberg &Williams, 1988). Goldberg et al. (1997) show that the 12-
item version of the GHQ has a sensitivity (correctly identifying in-
dividuals with mental health) of 83.7% and a speciﬁcity (suitably
identifying the proportion of individuals with mental health) of 79.0%.
Furthermore, gender, age and education do not appear to aﬀect the
validity of the GHQ (Goldberg et al., 1997). The GHQ also appears to be
robust to re-test eﬀects3 (Pevalin, 2000).
2.2. Covariates
A number of variables were added to our models to control for
further observable diﬀerences between individuals in treatment and
control groups. These variables were chosen for their relevance to
mental health, based on previous literature. These include: age; age-
squared; gender (Madden, 2010); whether the individual works part-
time; region (via the Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics,
NUTS); 4 occupation deﬁned as primary, secondary and tertiary sector
according to the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations
(ISCO 88);5 whether the individual works in a small (1-49), medium
(50-499) or large (> 500) ﬁrm; the season of the year (Teﬀt, 2012); and
whether the individual has a permanent contract (Carrieri, Novi,
Jacobs & Robone, 2014) as well as length of employment spells (i.e. the
number of days in current employment) (Paul &Moser, 2009).
Appendix A provides detailed deﬁnitions of each variable (Table A1).
3. Estimation strategy
Our empirical strategy exploits the policy experiment provided by
1 There is a large literature on the determinants of happiness, which often employs the
General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) – as used in this paper – as the main outcome
measure, see for example the work by Blanchﬂower and Oswald (2008); Gardner and
Oswald (2007); Oswald and Powdthavee (2008) as well as Dolan, Peasgood, and White
(2008).
2 It might be important to note that the self-employed might present a diﬀerent re-
lationship between wages and mental health compared to wage workers. We refer to
Rietveld, van Kippersluis, and Thurik (2014) for a comprehensive study on self-employ-
ment and mental health. We also acknowledge that retirees and individuals in the armed
forces might have systematically diﬀerent levels of mental health compared to the regular
workforce. This might be due to several factors including age (retired) and work-en-
vironment (armed forces).
3 Re-tests eﬀects refer to the concept of repeatability that using the same measure
(GHQ) on the same person, under the same conditions within a short-time frame multiple
times should produce only small variation.
4 NUTS is a hierarchical system used to identify subdivisions of EU member countries.
5 ISCO groups all occupations into a hierarchical system which has 10 groups at its
highest level (Legislators, senior oﬃcials and managers, Professionals, Technicians and
associate professionals, Clerks, Service workers and shop and market sales workers, Craft
and related trades workers, Plant and machine operators and assemblers, Elementary
occupations and the armed forces).
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the introduction of the NMW and involves the estimation of a series of
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DiD) models. DiD is an established econo-
metric method of ex-post policy evaluation (Angrist & Pischke, 2008).
In this case, DiD focuses on the diﬀerence in outcomes (GHQ) in pre-
and post-treatment periods between treated and control groups. Our
estimation strategy, including the deﬁnitions of control and treated
groups, follows well-established papers on the eﬀects of the NMW on
employment outcomes (Arulampalam, Booth & Bryan, 2004; Stewart,
2004b). The aim of this estimation strategy is to identify the average
treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT), in this case the change in GHQ
scores driven by the wage variation due to the NMW. This approach
assumes that changes in mental health between treated and control
groups would have developed in a similar way had the NMW not been
introduced (i.e. the standard common trend assumption). Our basic DiD
model is:
= + + + + ′ + +Y β β T β A β TA β X γ µit i t i t it i it0 1 2 3 4 (1)
Our main outcome of interest, Yit, is the GHQ Likert scale score of
individual i at time t. Tit is a binary indicator that identiﬁes individuals in
the treatment group (i.e. individuals aﬀected by the NMW) and At is an
indicator for the post-treatment period. β3 (the interaction between
treatment group indicator and post-treatment period) is the parameter of
interest as it provides an estimate of the treatment eﬀect. Xit represents a
vector of individual and job characteristics known to aﬀect mental health
e.g. age, gender, region of residence, workplace size, industry sector etc., γi
is an unobserved time-invariant individual-speciﬁc eﬀect and µit the
idiosyncratic error term clustered at the individual level (Bertrand,
Duﬂo&Mullainathan, 2004).
While we account for a number of observable factors, there might still
be other important unobservable individual characteristics such as genetic
predisposition to mental illness. If present and not accounted for, these
unobservable factors could potentially bias our estimates. For this reason
and to further explore the role of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity,
we present estimates from both pooled OLS models and ﬁxed eﬀects
speciﬁcations. Importantly, since a potential eﬀect of the minimum wage
on mental health would be a “second-order” (indirect) eﬀect, we also
explore “ﬁrst-order” (direct) eﬀects on wages and employment. This is to
ensure that the minimum wage had the expected impacts on labour out-
comes.
3.1. Identiﬁcation of treatment and control groups
We employ two alternative deﬁnitions of treatment and control
groups. The ﬁrst set of treatment and control groups is based on in-
formation on an individual’s hourly wage. We follow Arulampalam et al.
(2004) and derive the individual’s hourly wage as:
+ ×
usual gross pay per month
usual standard weekly hours usual paid over time weekly hours1.5 ( )
12
52
(2)
The numerator presents the usual gross pay per month transformed
into weekly pay. The denominator is the sum of the usual standard weekly
hours and paid overtime increased by 50%. Given that both numerator
and denominator are measured on a weekly basis, this ratio produces in-
dividual hourly pay rates. The derived wages were deﬂated to 1998 values
using Oﬃce for National Statistics Consumer Price Indices6 and variations
to the calculation of hourly wages were tested. An individual is included in
this ﬁrst treatment group if his or her wage in wave 8 of the BHPS (before
the introduction of the NMW) was below the minimum wage and there-
fore would have needed to increase to minimum wage levels between
waves 8 and 9. The amount of the NMW depends on an individual’s age:
the adult rate was £3.60/hour; while the 18-20 year old rate was £3.00/h;
and a “development rate” for workers older than 21 participating in
approved training programs was ﬁxed as £3.20/h.7
The control group was deﬁned using individuals whose wages fell be-
tween the NMW and 140% of the NMW before the introduction of the
NMW. The threshold of 140% (which is tested in our sensitivity analyses)
was used to build a group of individuals whose wages were just above the
minimumwage but were not aﬀected by the NMW.8 It is important to note
that using derived wage data to identify treatment and control groups
assumes both no measurement errors and that the self-reported informa-
tion closely reﬂects the actual per hour rates.9
The second set of treatment and control groups is based on a special
NMW question added to wave 9 of the BHPS (Stewart & Swaﬃeld, 2002).
According to this deﬁnition, the treatment group includes individuals who
replied “yes” to the question: “Has your pay or hourly rate in your current job
been increased to bring you up to the National Minimum Wage or has it re-
mained the same?”. Conversely, the control group comprises individuals
replying “no” to this question.
It should be noted that the use of this question might present some
limitations. First, the question is asked of everyone who met the eligibility
criteria for the NMW. Therefore, some individuals in the control group
(not eligible for the NMW) may have large hourly wages. In order to en-
sure that the control group was as similar as possible to the treatment
group, we restrict the highest wage of the control group to £7.20 per hour
(or twice the NMW rate). Secondly, the question was only asked of in-
dividuals who did not change jobs between 1st September 1999 and 30th
April 2000. This implies that the question is asked post-treatment (after
the introduction of the NMW). Hence, we cannot exclude the possibility
that replies to this question might be aﬀected by changes in mental health
that occurred during the course of the introduction of the NMW. An ad-
ditional consideration is that this question was only asked in wave 9,
therefore to be included in our analysis, individuals needed to be present
throughout waves 7 to 9.
Table 1 reports the questions used to build treatment and control
groups while Table 2 shows the number of observations per treatment and
control group.
Appendix A provides descriptive statistics showing statistically sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences between mean values of variables in treated and
control groups before the introduction of the NMW (Table A2). Table A3
provides a comparison of the treatment/control group deﬁnitions used in
this paper.
3.2. Robustness checks
In order to further check the validity of our main results, we provide a
wide range of robustness checks. Given that females usually report worse
mental health (Madden, 2010), we present separate analyses by gender. In
addition, we provide separate estimates for part-time workers as these
disproportionally represent individuals receiving the NMW.10 Further
checks relate to measurement error (limiting the sample to those who can
produce a payslip for the interviewer); testing variations in control groups,
including merging the two deﬁnitions of treated and control groups (self-
reported and wage-based); estimating our models on a balanced sample;
including only individuals who experience no job change; single person
6 Available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/timeseriestool.
7Within the BHPS we could only identify individuals aﬀected by the ﬁrst two rates.
However, previous research suggests that nobody in the BHPS might have been actually
aﬀected by the development rate (Arulampalam et al., 2004).
8We choose a 140% threshold in order to increase the sample size. This implies hourly
rates between £3.60-£5.04 and £3.00-£4.20 for control and treated groups, respectively.
We have also estimated our DiD models with diﬀerent thresholds (e.g. 110 and, 120%).
Results are available upon request and 100%-130% as well as 120%-140% are reported in
Table 5.
9 Stewart and Swaﬃeld (2002) discuss reasons for potential measurement error in
reported wages and hours, including overtime pay and presenting of payslips to the in-
terviewer. In any case, only systematic measurement error would aﬀect our estimation
strategy. We further discuss and account for misreporting in our sensitivity checks.
10 On the other hand, it could be argued that those working part-time often do so,
because their partner earns more. This is tested by focusing on one-person households.
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households; excluding any overtime adjustment; adding time trends; re-
ducing the sample to those with low baseline mental health; and sepa-
rately analysing each GHQ-item.
As part of verifying our results we attempt to replicate the results of
Reeves et al. (2016) using their treatment and control groups. Appendix D
also presents an alternative way of identifying individuals in the treated
group. This is obtained by applying a treatment intensity estimator based
on the computation of a wage gap between the actual wage and the
minimum wage applicable.
4. Results
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show trends of our measure of mental health (GHQ)
over time, separately by treated and control groups for both wage-based
and self-reported deﬁnitions, respectively. For the wage-based measure
(Fig. 1), the GHQ increases slightly from 1997-98 (wave 7) to 1998-99
(wave 8) in both treatment and control groups. The mean GHQ score then
declines from 1998-99 to 1999-00 (wave 9). Fig. 2 presents the same
graph for self-reported treatment and control groups. According to this
ﬁgure, both treatment and control groups appear to have increased their
mean GHQ scores from 1997-98 to 1998-99 and present a slight decrease between 1998-99 and 1999-00. Since higher GHQ scores correspond to
higher levels of mental health, this implies that the NMW might have
increased the mental health of individuals in these two groups. These
graphs also appear to display broadly similar GHQ trends before the in-
troduction of the policy.
Table 3 to Table 5 presents results of DiD models concerning the eﬀects
of the NMW on the GHQ. Each table separately reports results based on
wage-based and self-reported deﬁnitions of treated and control groups.
The ﬁrst column of each table includes treatment eﬀects for DiD models
estimated without control variables, while the second column includes
models with control variables. The upper parts of Table 3 and Table 4
include DiD models estimated using standard OLS, while the lower parts
present ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations. Table 5 shows robustness checks esti-
mated using OLS models.
Table 3 reports that the estimated treatment eﬀect of the introduction
of the NMW on mental health is negative, not statistically signiﬁcant and
around 0.20 GHQ points on the Likert scale for an OLS model without
covariates (wages-based deﬁnition of treatment and controls). The corre-
sponding estimated coeﬃcient for the alternative deﬁnition of treatment
and controls is also not statistically signiﬁcant, though positive and very
small at around 0.01 GHQ points. Treatment eﬀects obtained via OLS
Table 1
Questions used to deﬁne treatment and control groups.
Wage-based identiﬁer
Usual gross pay per month Usual monthly wage or salary payment before tax and other deductions in current
main job for employees.
Total weekly hours “Thinking about your (main) job, how many hours, excluding overtime and meal
breaks, are you expected to work in a normal week?”
Usual paid overtime weekly hours Number of hours overtime the individual works in a usual week
Self-reported identiﬁer
“Has your pay or hourly rate in your current job been increased to bring you up to the
National Minimum Wage introduced in April 1999?”
Potential answers:
Yes, No, Don’t know, Refused
Notes: questions presented under the label wage-based identiﬁer refer to those used to build the wage-based deﬁnition of treatment and control groups. The question reported under the
label self-reported identiﬁer was employed to build an alternative self-reported deﬁnition of treatment and control groups.
Table 2
Summary of treatment and control group deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition Selection variable Treatment Group N Control Group N
Wage-based group Derived wage in wave 8 (September 1998- March 1999) Wage<NMW 515 NMW<Wage<1.4 NMW 981
Self-identiﬁed group Answer to: “Has your pay or hourly rate in your current job been increased to bring you up
to the National Minimum Wage introduced in April 1999?” Potential answers: Yes, No,
Don’t know, Refused
Yes 683 No 2,950
1
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Fig. 1. GHQ over time split by treated and control (Wage based measure). Note: The
NMW was introduced between waves 8 and 9. The dots show the mean GHQ for waves 7-
9 separately for individuals in the treatment and the control group.
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Fig. 2. GHQ over time split by treated and control (Self-reported measure). Note: The
NMW was introduced between waves 8 and 9. The dots show the mean GHQ for waves 7-
9 separately for individuals in the treatment and the control group.
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models with covariates are similar and still not statistically signiﬁcant.
Fixed eﬀects speciﬁcations in Table 3 appear to present analogous results.
Noticeably, the signs of the estimated eﬀects switch from positive to ne-
gative when moving from OLS to FE estimates. Yet, it should be born in
mind that all estimated treatment eﬀects are not statistically diﬀerent from
zero. Full results of the OLS models from Table 3 with all covariates can be
found in Table A4 in Appendix A.
Table 4 shows results for the female sub-sample and reports positive
treatment eﬀects of between 0.13 and 0.29 GHQ points for the wage-based
deﬁnition and negative eﬀects of between -0.28 and -0.31 for the self-re-
ported deﬁnition using OLS with and without covariates. FE models pro-
duce treatment eﬀects of between 0.43 and 0.52 and -0.32 and -0.40 for
models with and without covariates, respectively. However, none of these
estimates are statistically signiﬁcant. Overall, this appears to imply that the
introduction of the NMW had no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on mental
health. In addition, the direction of the eﬀect does not appear to be clearly
deﬁned.
Results in Appendix B (Table A5 and Table A6) suggest wages were
substantially aﬀected by the NMW and employment was also positively
aﬀected (under the self-reported deﬁnition of treatment and control groups)
suggesting the NMW had the intended eﬀect on wages and no negative
eﬀect on employment, which in turn might have aﬀected mental health.
4.1. Robustness checks
Table 5 includes results from our robustness checks. Here, we examine
the sensitivity of our results to the wage-based deﬁnition of treated and
control groups used in our main models. To do this, we employ further
control groups for the wage-based measure using individuals with wages
100-130% and 120-140% of the NMW. In all of these speciﬁcations, es-
timates of treatment eﬀects appear to be positive but not statistically
Table 3
Main models for the eﬀect of the NMW on GHQ.
OLS Wage based Self-reported
DiD DiD with
covariates
DiD DiD with
covariates
DiD Coeﬀ. -0.20 -0.41 0.01 0.02
95% C.I. (-1.37 -
0.97)
(-1.57 - 0.74) (-0.80 -
0.81)
(-0.78 - 0.82)
Observations 1,457 1,457 3,529 3,529
Fixed eﬀects Wage based Self-reported
DiD Coeﬀ. 0.32 0.25 -0.14 -0.09
95% C.I. (-0.81 -
1.45)
(-0.89 - 1.39) (-0.98 -
0.70)
(-0.92 - 0.75)
Observations 1,457 1,457 3,529 3,529
Notes: 95% conﬁdence intervals in parentheses, *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%,
***signiﬁcant at 1%. This table reports average treatment eﬀects on the treated (ATT)
obtained from panel data diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DiD) models. The outcome variable is
the GHQ12 on the 0-36 scale. The table is split vertically by whether wage information or
self-reported information was used to identify treated and control groups. The table is
split horizontally by whether OLS or ﬁxed eﬀects models were used to estimate the eﬀect.
Table 4
Main models for the eﬀect of the NMW on GHQ for females.
Wage based Self-reported
DiD DiD with
covariates
DiD DiD with
covariates
OLS
DiD Coeﬀ. 0.29 0.13 -0.31 -0.28
95% C.I. (-1.41 -
1.99)
(-1.51 - 1.76) (-1.33 -
0.70)
(-1.30 - 0.75)
Observations 717 717 1,804 1,804
Fixed eﬀects Wage based Self-reported
DiD Coeﬀ. 0.52 0.43 -0.40 -0.32
95% C.I. (-1.08 -
2.11)
(-1.25 - 2.12) (-1.48 -
0.68)
(-1.39 - 0.76)
Observations 717 717 1,804 1,804
Notes: 95% conﬁdence intervals in parentheses, *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%,
***signiﬁcant at 1%. This table reports average treatment eﬀects on the treated (ATT)
obtained from panel data diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DiD) models. The outcome variable is
the GHQ12 on the 0-36 scale. The table is split vertically by whether wage information or
self-reported information was used to identify treated and control groups. The table is
split horizontally by whether OLS or ﬁxed eﬀects models were used to estimate the eﬀect.
Table 5
Robustness checks using OLS.
Wage based Self-reported
DiD DiD with
covariates
DiD DiD with
covariates
Interviewer has seen payslip of interviewee
DiD Coeﬀ. -0.71 -1.04 -0.60 -0.89
95% C.I. (-2.91 -
1.50)
(-3.21 - 1.13) (-2.32 -
1.12)
(-2.60 - 0.82)
Observations 411 411 990 990
Part-time workers only
DiD Coeﬀ. -0.40 -0.64 0.43 0.37
95% C.I. (-3.03 -
2.22)
(-3.18 - 1.90) (-0.94 -
1.80)
(-1.04 - 1.78)
Observations 280 280 688 688
Control group including only individuals with a stable wage
DiD Coeﬀ. -2.40 -2.30
95% C.I. (-7.87 -
3.06)
(-7.44 - 2.83)
Observations 540 540
Control group equal>NWM& <= 130%
DiD Coeﬀ. -0.16 -0.42
95% C.I. (-1.38 -
1.07)
(-1.63 - 0.78)
Observations 1,217 1,217
No job change
DiD Coeﬀ. -0.20 -0.41
95% C.I. (-1.37 -
0.97)
(-1.57 - 0.74)
Observations 1,457 1,457
Control Group 120-140% of NMW
DiD Coeﬀ. -0.30 -0.38
95% C.I. (-1.60 -
1.00)
(-1.68 - 0.92)
Observations 1,003 1,003
No overtime adjustment
DiD Coeﬀ. 0.50 0.26
95% C.I. (-0.82 -
1.83)
(-1.03 - 1.55)
Observations 1,198 1,198
Only one person households
DiD Coeﬀ. -2.25 -1.15 0.45 0.06
95% C.I. (-6.93 -
2.42)
(-5.37 - 3.07) (-3.33 -
4.24)
(-4.03 - 4.15)
Observations 95 95 282 282
Balanced sample
DiD Coeﬀ. -0.15 -0.29 -0.01 0.01
95% C.I. (-1.40 -
1.10)
(-1.54 - 0.96) (-0.88 -
0.85)
(-0.86 - 0.87)
Observations 1,238 1,238 2,809 2,807
Combination of both treatment/control group deﬁnitions
DiD Coeﬀ. 1.22 1.13
95% C.I. (-1.36 - 3.80) (-1.38 -
3.64)
Observations 592 592
Added time-trend and squared time trend
DiD Coeﬀ. -0.20 -0.41 0.01 0.06
95% C.I. (-1.37 -
0.97)
(-1.57 - 0.75) (-0.80 -
0.81)
(-0.74 - 0.86)
Observations 1,457 1,457 3,529 3,529
(continued on next page)
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signiﬁcant, conﬁrming previous results. Furthermore, to mitigate potential
measurement error in self-reported wages used to build the alternative
deﬁnition of treatment and control groups, we estimate our models on a
sample of individuals who were asked to produce payslips. The treatment
eﬀects are -0.73 and -0.62 on the GHQ Likert scale for the wage-based and
self-reported deﬁnitions respectively. We also estimate separate models for
part-time workers as they might have been more frequently aﬀected by the
NMW compared to full-time workers (Manning&Petrongolo, 2008). The
resulting treatment eﬀects are -0.46 and 0.47 (GHQ Likert scale) for wage-
based and self-reported deﬁnitions and both are not statistically sig-
niﬁcant.
In order to account for wage increases that might have oﬀset the
minimum wage, we estimate a model in which the control group is reduced
to those individuals who had the same wage throughout the study period
and also ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects. This model can only be estimated for the
wage-based deﬁnition and the corresponding treatment eﬀect is -2.43 GHQ
scores. In addition, to explore potential issues related to second earners
within the same household, we tested our DiD models on a sample of one-
person households. Invariably, treatment eﬀects for all other robustness
checks are still not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Finally, we also present
robustness checks for the subscales of the GHQ in Table 6. Throughout all
robustness checks, we do not identify any statistically signiﬁcant relation-
ship between the introduction of the NMW and mental health.
Further robustness checks in Appendix C present an attempt to replicate
results of Reeves et al. (2016) (Table A8 and Table A9). Using their treat-
ment and control group deﬁnitions, our results diﬀer from theirs and show
no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of the introduction of the NMW on GHQ.
Appendix D (Table A10) shows estimates obtained from the treatment in-
tensity estimator. The corresponding estimated eﬀects are still not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant.
5. Discussion and conclusions
We exploit the policy experiment provided by the introduction of the UK
national minimumwage and explore the causal impact of wage increases on
mental health among low-wage workers. We employ data drawn from the
BHPS and estimate a series of diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence models. We ﬁnd only
limited and not statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of the NMW onmental health.
Our main ﬁndings appear to be conﬁrmed by several robustness checks and
alternative deﬁnitions of treatment and control groups.
Given the current debate around the living wage and the eﬀects of
mental health on employment and productivity, exploring the eﬀects of the
UK NMW on mental health is particularly relevant in the UK as well as
internationally. Accordingly, several countries have recently introduced
minimum wages such as China (Chinese Ministry of Labour and Social
Security, 2004), Hong Kong (Legislative Council of Hong Kong, 2010) and
Germany (CDU, CSU&SPD, 2013). Furthermore, while evidence shows that
mental illness appears to be concentrated among the low-wage earners
(Meltzer et al., 2002), the direction of this eﬀect is still disputed. This study
does not identify statistically signiﬁcant changes in mental health driven by
wage increases, shedding some further light on the potential causal link
between wages and mental health.
Moreover, our ﬁndings appear to diﬀer from the ones of a recent paper
from Reeves et al. (2016). Whereas they do not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects on a number of physical health outcomes and behaviours, they ap-
pear to identify a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the UK NMW on mental health. We
believe this result might be mainly due to the diﬀerent way we build
treatment and control groups. More speciﬁcally, Reeves et al. (2016) appear
to compare two alternative sets of treatment and control groups: one set
compares eligible recipients versus ineligible non-recipients (individuals
with wages just above the minimum wage threshold), while a second set
contrasts eligible recipients with eligible non-recipients. Although the former
set of treatment and control groups is similar to the wage-based comparison
also employed here, the latter is akin to an intention to treat (ITT) analysis,
i.e. it appears to be based on the initial treatment assignment (eligibility to
the NMW) rather than the actual treatment received. Furthermore, both of
their deﬁnitions rely on self-reported wages and, diﬀerently from our work,
they do not appear to make use of the special minimum wage question
included in the BHPS. Importantly, since Reeves et al. (2016) appears to
ﬁnd larger and more signiﬁcant eﬀects on mental health in their second
comparison (the ITT analysis), our results may substantially diﬀer in their
interpretation. In any case, our deﬁnitions of treatment and controls result
in a larger sample size, i.e. 172 in Reeves et al. (2016) versus 1,500 to 3,500
observations depending on the deﬁnition in our study. Further diﬀerences
between our works might include the number and types of controls.11
Table 5 (continued)
Wage based Self-reported
DiD DiD with
covariates
DiD DiD with
covariates
Restricted to those with low baseline GHQ (GHQ>18) in wave 8
DiD Coeﬀ. -0.39 -1.37 -2.25 -2.09
95% C.I. (-5.09 –
4.30)
(-2.27 – 2.68) (-6.79 –
2.28)
(-6.85 – 2.66)
Observations 154 154 228 228
Notes: 95% conﬁdence intervals in parentheses, *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%,
***signiﬁcant at 1%. This table reports average treatment eﬀects on the treated (ATT)
obtained from panel data diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DiD) models. The outcome variable is
the GHQ12 on the 0-36 scale. The table is split vertically by whether wage information or
self-reported information was used to identify treated and control groups. The type of
robustness check that was undertaken splits the table horizontally.
Table 6
Eﬀects of the introduction of the NMW on GHQ subscales.
OLS with control variables
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6
Wage-based
Coeﬀ. -0.09 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 0.03 -0.06
95% C.I. (-0.20 -
0.03)
(-0.17 -
0.17)
(-0.17 -
0.09)
(-0.18 -
0.04)
(-0.14 -
0.19)
(-0.22 -
0.10)
N 1,464 1,464 1,464 1,464 1,466 1,467
Self-reported
Coeﬀ. -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.07* 0.03 0.02
95% C.I. (-0.12 -
0.05)
(-0.11 -
0.12)
(-0.09 -
0.07)
(-0.15 -
0.00)
(-0.08 -
0.15)
(-0.08 -
0.13)
N 3,548 3,548 3,547 3,547 3,549 3,549
7 8 9 10 11 12
Wage-based
Coeﬀ. -0.08 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 0.08
95% C.I. (-0.21 -
0.05)
(-0.15 -
0.08)
(-0.24 -
0.11)
(-0.20 -
0.11)
(-0.17 -
0.10)
(-0.06 -
0.21)
N 1,466 1,467 1,467 1,468 1,468 1,468
Self-reported
Coeﬀ. 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00
95% C.I. (-0.06 -
0.12)
(-0.09 -
0.08)
(-0.15 -
0.11)
(-0.06 -
0.16)
(-0.09 -
0.09)
(-0.09 -
0.09)
N 3,549 3,550 3,550 3,546 3,546 3,547
Notes: 95% conﬁdence intervals in parentheses, *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%,
***signiﬁcant at 1%. The items are: Concentration (1), Loss of sleep (2), Playing a useful
role (3), Capable of making decisions (4), Constantly under strain (5), Problem over-
coming diﬃculties (6), Enjoy day-to-day activities (7), Ability to face problems (8),
Unhappy or depressed (9), Losing conﬁdence (10), Believe in self-worth (11), General
happiness (12). This table reports average treatment eﬀects on the treated (ATT) obtained
from panel data diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DiD) models. The outcome variable is the
GHQ12 on the 0-36 scale. The table is split horizontally by whether wage information or
self-reported information was used to identify treated and control groups. The 12 GHQ
subscales split the table vertically.
11 For further details about the diﬀerences between our analysis and the one of Reeves
et al. (2016), see our replication of their results in Appendix C.
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Our analysis has some potential limitations. First, since our models
focus only on individuals who were already employed, they would not
be able to identify changes in mental health potentially caused by in-
creased unemployment due to the NMW. However, our robustness
checks and the previous literature on the NMW ﬁnd only limited evi-
dence of signiﬁcant employment eﬀects (Card & Krueger, 1993; Metcalf,
2008; Stewart, 2004a; Stewart, 2004b). Secondly, our models and data
focus on short-run eﬀects. This implies that the long-run eﬀects of the
NMW on mental health may vary and could potentially increase over
time. Thirdly, it is possible that individuals will have somehow antici-
pated the introduction of the NMW. While the NMW was part of the
1997 election campaign debate and so employees might have been
aware of a potential wage increase, its actual level was only announced
publicly on the 6th of March, i.e. 25 days before its implementation.
Also because of this, anticipation might not have played a major role in
our data (McCartney, 1999). Finally, stigma attached to the NMW and
any potential negative eﬀect of this on their mental health may coun-
tervail or reduce any positive wage eﬀect, resulting in a zero net eﬀect
on mental health.
Given our ﬁndings, a strong policy conclusion may be premature.
However, it is possible that larger increases in wages will lead to a more
pronounced impact on mental health. Since many of the costs of mental
illness, such as lost productivity or absenteeism, are borne by em-
ployers, the beneﬁts of improved mental health and sustaining people
in employment may outweigh costs of increased wages.
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found in
the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2017.08.007.
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